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  • Using a significant auditing event-the going concern audit opinion-we investigate the market’s forecasting ability and the importance of firm fundamentals in predicting the going concern event. First, we find that the equity market signals the upcoming going concern announcement as early as 30 days in advance. Specifically, during the window of [-30, -1] leading up to the announcement, the excess returns to going concern firms are 9.98% worse than the matched distressed firms. Moreover, short sellers, a group of sophisticated investors, significantly increase their shorting activities during days before the release of the going concern opinions. Furthermore, we find that firm fundamentals, which are observable to the market, are significantly predictive to the issuances of going concern. These variables include a firm’s operating performance (return on assets and operating cash flows), equity market liquidity, stock momentum, and filing delay. Overall, our evidence supports the perception that the market can forecast the going concern opinion release and points out its possible channel as well.

  • The Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) is documented to curb executive risk-taking and firm risk. Utilizing SOX as an exogenous shock on firm risk, we find that proxy fight threats are positively related to a firm’s total risk and idiosyncratic risk. Specifically, although firm risk generally decreases post-SOX, high proxy fight threats mitigate this change in firm risk. We also find that although firms adopt more conservative policies such as decreasing their leverage and payout post-SOX, these changes are mitigated by proxy fight threats. In sum, our findings indicate that proxy fights act as an external disciplinary mechanism, encourage executive risk-taking, and increase firm risk.

Last update from database: 3/13/26, 4:15 PM (UTC)

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