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In recent years, situationism in psychology has caught the attention of philosophers. Some have defended it. Some have argued against it. The situationist has challenged the traditional view shared by personality psychology and virtue ethics that people differ in terms of character or character traits and that we can explain and predict people's behavior by character traits people have. Previous responses to situationism try to show that experiments from social psychology do not undermine the traditional view. I agree and will further argue that the fact that experiments do not undermine the traditional view is not sufficient to warrant the attribution of character traits, and that some philosophical arguments are needed given that not enough empirical data that show a high degree of behavioral consistencies are available. I first offer an account of the ordinary attribution of character traits according to which having character traits is a matter of degree, and argue that the ordinary attribution account comes from the Aristotelian moral psychology and is consistent with a long-standing tradition, the trait paradigm, in personality psychology. Second, I argue that although situational factors play some role in explaining and predicting behavior, the attribution of character traits plays a primary and indispensable role. Third, I argue that ordinary attribution of character traits has important functions in our moral life, which cannot be fulfilled by the attribution of local traits suggested by the situationist. I also argue that the ethical management of situations recommended by the situationist can help in getting things right, but is not sufficient to be the adequate foundation for our normative discourse. © 2016 American Psychological Association.

The author agrees with James Moor that computer technology, because it is 'logically malleable', is bringing about a genuine social revolution. Moor compares the computer reVolution to the 'industrial revolution' of the late 18th and the 19th centuries; but it is argued here that a better comparison is with the 'printing press revolution' that occurred two centuries before that. Just as the major ethical theories of Bentham and Kant were developed in response to the printing press revolution, so a new ethical theory is likely to emerge from computer ethics in response to the computer revolution. The newly emerging field of information ethics, therefore, is much more important than even its founders and advocates believe. © John Weckert 2007. All rights reserved.

This book explores the memory and representation of genocide as they affect individuals, communities and families, and artistic representations. It brings together a variety of disciplines from public health to philosophy, anthropology to architecture, offering readers interdisciplinary and international insights into one of the most important challenges in the 21st century. The book begins by describing the definitions and concepts of genocide from historical and philosophical perspectives. Next, it reviews memories of genocide in bodies and in societies as well as genocide in memory through lives, mental health and transgenerational effects. The book also examines the ways genocide has affected artistic works. From poetry to film, photography to theatre, it explores a range of artistic approaches to help demonstrate the heterogeneity of representations. This book provides a comprehensive and wide-ranging assessment of the many ways genocide has been remembered and represented. It presents an ideal foundation for understanding genocide and possibly preventing it from occurring again. © Springer International Publishing AG 2018.

Based on a pragmatist inspired conception of the social self, the concept of reparations for the harms of genocide is reexamined. Both Raphael Lemkin, the person who invented the term “genocide,” and Claudia Card, a philosopher who examined the evil of genocide, hold similarly expansive notions of the harms inflicted by genocidal violence. Both argued that biological death is not necessarily central to genocide. For Lemkin cultural destruction of the targeted group is just as essential as the actual killing itself. Genocide is a group crime that aims to destroy the group and all the social aspects of group identity. Card similarly sees the target of genocidal violence as the social vitality of the self. This vitality is sustained by group relations. Reparations thus need to be reconceptualize in terms of the restoration of social life of the victim group and not solely on the basis of economic losses. Examples are given for the reparation of the social vitality of communities that have suffered genocide. © 2020 Central European Pragmatist Forum. All rights reserved.

Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to explore an emerging ethical theory for the Digital Age – Flourishing Ethics – which will likely be applicable in many different cultures worldwide, addressing not only human concerns but also activities, decisions and consequences of robots, cyborgs, artificially intelligent agents and other new digital technologies. Design/methodology/approach: In the past, a number of influential ethical theories in Western philosophy have focused upon choice and autonomy, or pleasure and pain or fairness and justice. These are important ethical concepts, but we consider “flourishing” to be a broader “umbrella concept” under which all of the above ideas can be included, plus additional ethical ideas from cultures in other regions of the world (for example, Buddhist, Muslim, Confucianist cultures and others). Before explaining the applied approach, this study discusses relevant ideas of four example thinkers who emphasize flourishing in their ethics writings: Aristotle, Norbert Wiener, James Moor and Simon Rogerson. Findings: Flourishing Ethics is not a single ethical theory. It is “an approach,” a “family” of similar ethical theories which can be successfully applied to humans in many different cultures, as well as to non-human agents arising from new digital technologies. Originality/value: This appears to be the first extended analysis of the emerging flourishing ethics “family” of theories. © 2021, Emerald Publishing Limited.

Wang Yangming believes that human nature is entirely good. A question naturally arises: where is evil from? It has been argued that Wang’s idealism gives rise to the problem of evil. I first argue that the difficulty for Wang to have a coherent account of evil can be removed when his idealism is understood in a narrow sense. Second, I offer an account of Wang’s view on evil in three steps. First, I argue that evil comes from the interaction between humans and the external world according to Wang. Second, I show that given Wang’s account of human nature with three aspects, there is no contradiction between Wang’s claim that human nature is the same in everyone and Wang’s claim about differences in our natural endowment which affect our moral practice. Third, I argue that Wang’s doctrine of non-distinction of good and evil in the original substance of human nature is uniquely Confucian. © 2020 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.

The author agrees with James Moor that computer technology, because it is 'logically malleable', is bringing about a genuine social revolution. Moor compares the computer revolution to the 'industrial revolution' of the late 18th and the 19th centuries; but it is argued here that a better comparison is with the 'printing press revolution' that occurred two centuries before that. Just as the major ethical theories of Bentham and Kant were developed in response to the printing press revolution, so a new ethical theory is likely to emerge from computer ethics in response to the computer revolution. The newly emerging field of information ethics, therefore, is much more important than even its founders and advocates believe.

This article discusses the foresight of philosopher/mathematician Norbert Wiener who, in the 1940s, founded Information Ethics as a research discipline. Wiener envisioned the coming of an “automatic age” in which information technology would have profound social and ethical impacts upon the world. He predicted, for example, machines that will learn, reason and play games; “automatic factories” that will replace assembly-line workers and middle managers with computerized devices; workers who will perform their jobs over great distances with the aid of new communication technologies; and people who will gain remarkable powers by adding computerized “prostheses” to their bodies. To analyze the ethical implications of such developments, Wiener presented some principles of justice and employed a powerful practical method of ethical analysis. © 2004, Emerald Group Publishing Limited

The cluster of concerns usually identified as matters of privacy can be adequately accounted for by unpacking our natural rights to life, liberty, and property. Privacy as derived from fundamental natural rights to life, liberty, and property encompasses the advantages of the control and restricted access theories without their attendant difficulties., (C)2003 Kluwer Academic Publishers