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This article considers the second treatise of Schelling's Abhandlungen zur Erläuterung des Idealismus der Wissenschaftslehre (Treatises Explaining the Idealism of the Science of Knowledge, 1796/97), a lesser-known work from the early Schelling. Here, Schelling proposes to defend the critical position insofar as it purports to be a system based on human reason, but instead he issues a backhanded critique of the assumption on behalf of the critical philosophers to try and limit the bounds of pure reason by means of their own use of reason. Schelling then offers an alternative way to think about the relationship of mind (Geist) and matter in nature. This article argues that Schelling's actual explanation of the critical philosophy as a position founded by reasonable minds ultimately belies his promise to defend it, thus calling into question that Schelling's thought prior to 1800 was a mere reiteration of Kantian/Fichtean transcendentalism. Copyright © 2015 The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA.

In Aristotle's Physics iv 10-14, Aristotle argues for a time concept derived with, on a weak version, sense perception, and, on a strong version, from sense perception along with intellection (nous), from change in nature. On both accounts, actualized time for Aristotle requires cognitive faculties. Aristotle's time concept has thus been linked with Kant's treatment of time in the Transcendental Aesthetic of his First Critique. More importantly, the conclusion that time is "unreal" for Aristotle elicits charges of adulterating Aristotle's conclusions by reading Aristotle's Physics with a Kantian lens. In this paper, I examine the context of Kant's conclusions about time and, by way of a contrast between the Aristotelian and Kantian projects, argue for a fundamental dissimilarity of their accounts. And yet, I reserve the possibility that one both ascent to this fundamental dissimilarity and hold that Aristotle was not a temporal realist. © 2015. Idealistic Studies.

Despite the language we saw in the previous chapter, which allowed for time apprehension by perception and marking, in Physics iv 14, Aristotle famously argues that time is dependent on nous. © 2015, The Author(s).

Contemporary discourse about human rights makes pragmatic use of the 1948 United Nations Universal Declaration on Human Rights, as the Declaration presents a set of guidelines that are based on assumptions about the nature of human beings: Their thoughts, ideas, freedom of expression and freedom of association.1 Article 1 of the Declaration states, for example, that ‘All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.’ The document engages the idea of the human being as having rights, regardless of ethnicity or gender. Such rights include life, protection from harm, and access to the latest in scientific technology.2 © Philipa Rothfield, Cleo Fleming and Paul A. Komesaroff 2008.

In recent years, situationism in psychology has caught the attention of philosophers. Some have defended it. Some have argued against it. The situationist has challenged the traditional view shared by personality psychology and virtue ethics that people differ in terms of character or character traits and that we can explain and predict people's behavior by character traits people have. Previous responses to situationism try to show that experiments from social psychology do not undermine the traditional view. I agree and will further argue that the fact that experiments do not undermine the traditional view is not sufficient to warrant the attribution of character traits, and that some philosophical arguments are needed given that not enough empirical data that show a high degree of behavioral consistencies are available. I first offer an account of the ordinary attribution of character traits according to which having character traits is a matter of degree, and argue that the ordinary attribution account comes from the Aristotelian moral psychology and is consistent with a long-standing tradition, the trait paradigm, in personality psychology. Second, I argue that although situational factors play some role in explaining and predicting behavior, the attribution of character traits plays a primary and indispensable role. Third, I argue that ordinary attribution of character traits has important functions in our moral life, which cannot be fulfilled by the attribution of local traits suggested by the situationist. I also argue that the ethical management of situations recommended by the situationist can help in getting things right, but is not sufficient to be the adequate foundation for our normative discourse. © 2016 American Psychological Association.

The author agrees with James Moor that computer technology, because it is 'logically malleable', is bringing about a genuine social revolution. Moor compares the computer reVolution to the 'industrial revolution' of the late 18th and the 19th centuries; but it is argued here that a better comparison is with the 'printing press revolution' that occurred two centuries before that. Just as the major ethical theories of Bentham and Kant were developed in response to the printing press revolution, so a new ethical theory is likely to emerge from computer ethics in response to the computer revolution. The newly emerging field of information ethics, therefore, is much more important than even its founders and advocates believe. © John Weckert 2007. All rights reserved.

Based on a pragmatist inspired conception of the social self, the concept of reparations for the harms of genocide is reexamined. Both Raphael Lemkin, the person who invented the term “genocide,” and Claudia Card, a philosopher who examined the evil of genocide, hold similarly expansive notions of the harms inflicted by genocidal violence. Both argued that biological death is not necessarily central to genocide. For Lemkin cultural destruction of the targeted group is just as essential as the actual killing itself. Genocide is a group crime that aims to destroy the group and all the social aspects of group identity. Card similarly sees the target of genocidal violence as the social vitality of the self. This vitality is sustained by group relations. Reparations thus need to be reconceptualize in terms of the restoration of social life of the victim group and not solely on the basis of economic losses. Examples are given for the reparation of the social vitality of communities that have suffered genocide. © 2020 Central European Pragmatist Forum. All rights reserved.

Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to explore an emerging ethical theory for the Digital Age – Flourishing Ethics – which will likely be applicable in many different cultures worldwide, addressing not only human concerns but also activities, decisions and consequences of robots, cyborgs, artificially intelligent agents and other new digital technologies. Design/methodology/approach: In the past, a number of influential ethical theories in Western philosophy have focused upon choice and autonomy, or pleasure and pain or fairness and justice. These are important ethical concepts, but we consider “flourishing” to be a broader “umbrella concept” under which all of the above ideas can be included, plus additional ethical ideas from cultures in other regions of the world (for example, Buddhist, Muslim, Confucianist cultures and others). Before explaining the applied approach, this study discusses relevant ideas of four example thinkers who emphasize flourishing in their ethics writings: Aristotle, Norbert Wiener, James Moor and Simon Rogerson. Findings: Flourishing Ethics is not a single ethical theory. It is “an approach,” a “family” of similar ethical theories which can be successfully applied to humans in many different cultures, as well as to non-human agents arising from new digital technologies. Originality/value: This appears to be the first extended analysis of the emerging flourishing ethics “family” of theories. © 2021, Emerald Publishing Limited.

Wang Yangming believes that human nature is entirely good. A question naturally arises: where is evil from? It has been argued that Wang’s idealism gives rise to the problem of evil. I first argue that the difficulty for Wang to have a coherent account of evil can be removed when his idealism is understood in a narrow sense. Second, I offer an account of Wang’s view on evil in three steps. First, I argue that evil comes from the interaction between humans and the external world according to Wang. Second, I show that given Wang’s account of human nature with three aspects, there is no contradiction between Wang’s claim that human nature is the same in everyone and Wang’s claim about differences in our natural endowment which affect our moral practice. Third, I argue that Wang’s doctrine of non-distinction of good and evil in the original substance of human nature is uniquely Confucian. © 2020 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.