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This paper defends the thesis that privacy as a right is derived from fundamental rights to life, liberty, and property and does not permit restricting the commodification of bodily material; however, privacy as life, liberty, property does require conventions that ensure a robust and just market in bodily material. The analysis proceeds by defending a general commitment to liberty and markets, but not in the manner one might expect from a 'doctrinaire' libertarian. Ethical concerns about commodification are legitimate in the context of new medical and information technologies, but these concerns are not sufficiently well defined to justify political conclusions, since not every ethical concern is in itself a political concern, and the best way to resolve certain ethical difficulties is to draw up political boundaries that facilitate the discovery and testing of various solutions to our ethical puzzles. To illustrate the point, I will indicate how privacy as life, liberty, property defines such a dynamic solution to the problems of commodification of human bodily material and slippery information in insurance markets.

The information ethics (IE) of Floridi and Sanders is evaluated here in the light of an alternative in virtue ethics that is antifoundationalist, particularist, and relativist in contrast to Floridi's foundationalist, impartialist, and universalist commitments. Drawing from disparate traditional sources like Aristotle, Nietzsche, and Emerson, as well as contemporary advocates of virtue ethics like Nussbaum, Foot, and Williams, the essay shows that the central contentions of IE, including especially the principle of ontological equality, must either express commitments grounded in the particular perspectives we already inhabit, or be without rational or ethical force for us. © 2010 Metaphilosophy LLC and Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Wealth and income are highly predictive of health and longevity. Egalitarians who maintain that this “socioeconomic-status gradient” in health is unjust are challenged by the fact that a significant component of it is owed to the higher prevalence of certain kinds of voluntary risk-taking among members of lower socioeconomic groups. Some egalitarians have argued that these apparently free personal choices are not genuinely free, and that those who make them should not be held morally responsible for the resulting harms to their health. I argue to the contrary that such choices usually are fully free, and that those who make them are responsible for their consequences. This does not imply, however, that society cannot also be responsible for those consequences. It is responsible for them if they are statistically foreseeable and avoidable outcomes of unjust public institutions and policies. I show that many of the harms to health that contribute to the voluntary behavioral component of the SES health gradient satisfy that description. Society can therefore be morally responsible for those harms, even though the individuals who suffer them are also fully responsible for them.

In this article, I introduce a new interpretation of the puzzling thesis “bai 白 (white) ma 馬 (horse) fei 非 (is not) ma 馬 (horse)” argued by Gongsun Long 公孫龍 in his essay “On White Horse (Bai Ma Lun 白馬論).” I argue that previous interpretations, which can be grouped under the name of “attribute-object interpretations,” are not satisfactory, and that the thesis on the new interpretation is not about attributes or objects, but about names. My argument focuses on the disagreement over inseparability of white (shou bai zhi zheng 守白之爭) between Gongsun Long and his interlocutor in the text of “On White Horse.” On my interpretation or the name interpretation, the disagreement is about whether constituents of a syntactically complex or multi-term name are separable or have their contextually independent meanings. Gongsun Long’s thesis makes perfect sense on my interpretation, and is supported by the text and other preserved texts collected in GongsunLong Zi 公孫龍子. The name interpretation can also make sense of some puzzling expressions of sophists in the classic period.

Virtual Reality (VR) experiences have arrived for a wide audience, and some worry that VR experience entices us to abandon experience In Real Life (IRL). While such worries cannot be dismissed out of hand, they are liable to be imprecise and distorted without careful analysis of the opportunity costs of VR experience. Generally, we are not liable to abandon real experience for its virtual analogue. Even a perfect VR experience is generally not a perfect substitute for a like experience IRL. Instead, the success of VR will depend on its ability to produce experiences valued for what they actually are.

Criticism and Compassion: The Ethics and Politics of Claudia Card offers a unique perspective on the range of issues explored by Card during her distinguished career in philosophy. Investigates her work as an early leader in the development of feminist philosophy, challenging many preconceptions about the society’s norms regarding gender, marriage, and motherhood Crossing many disciplinary boundaries, her concept of social death has come to play a significant role in multidisciplinary field of genocide studies This volume combines many of Claudia Card’s important essays with recently commissioned essays by leading philosophers whose work has been influenced by Card The full scope of Card’s philosophy is presented here - both in her own words and those of her critics and interpreters

This chapter describes and analyzes an ongoing project of memorialization of the Armenian Genocide in Turkey. It explores the importance of memorialization for collective historical memory, especially in situations where historical memory has been subverted by genocide denial. Among many aspects of memorialization, its role in bearing witness is explored and highlighted. Three components of the memory project are described: (1) the photography exhibitions, (2) the publications, and (3) the creation of memory sites. The project centers on the story of the Dildilian family in Ottoman Turkey before, during, and after the genocide, covering the years 1872–1923. A microhistory of the life of the Armenian minority is chronicled by means of the personal memories and stories of members of the family. The history is richly illustrated with photographs and drawings that serve as the basis of the photography exhibitions and books. Exhibitions and associated talks and panels have taken place in Istanbul, Merzifon, Diyarbakir, and Ankara. The chapter describes and analyzes the reaction of the Turkish public to the project.

This book explores the memory and representation of genocide as they affect individuals, communities and families, and artistic representations. It brings together a variety of disciplines from public health to philosophy, anthropology to architecture, offering readers interdisciplinary and international insights into one of the most important challenges in the 21st century. The book begins by describing the definitions and concepts of genocide from historical and philosophical perspectives. Next, it reviews memories of genocide in bodies and in societies as well as genocide in memory through lives, mental health and transgenerational effects. The book also examines the ways genocide has affected artistic works. From poetry to film, photography to theatre, it explores a range of artistic approaches to help demonstrate the heterogeneity of representations. This book provides a comprehensive and wide-ranging assessment of the many ways genocide has been remembered and represented. It presents an ideal foundation for understanding genocide and possibly preventing it from occurring again

This chapter identifies an orchestrated effort in “Republika Srpska”—an entity within Bosnia and Herzegovina that was recognized by the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement − that is designed to prevent survivors of the genocide from erecting memorials to the victims in such locations as Višegrad, Prijedor, and Foča. While memorials for victims have been prohibited, and survivors have been prevented from using the term “genocide,” memorials to the perpetrators have been installed in the center of Višegrad, and near the Trnopolje concentration camp in Prijedor Municipality. In the hills above Sarajevo, in a location from which the city’s residents were attacked during the siege, a plaque honoring indicted war criminal Ratko Mladić has been installed. Accordingly, this chapter considers the extent to which the discriminatory practices regarding memorials in Republika Srpska constitute a violation of human rights. Further, the chapter argues that, following Raphael Lemkin’s definition of genocide, the prohibitive policies in Republika Srpska with respect to memorials and commemorative practices constitute nothing less than a continuation of the genocide, a second phase of the genocide designed to ensure the permanent erasure of a world that was destroyed. These human rights violations and the continuation of the genocide are a troubling testament to the failure of the international community in Bosnia, and to the problematic legacy of the Dayton Peace Agreement.