Testing Trade-Off and Pecking Order Models Under Different Institutional Environments
Resource type
Authors/contributors
- Farhat, Joseph B. (Author)
- Cotei, Carmen (Author)
- Abugri, Benjamin A. (Author)
Title
Testing Trade-Off and Pecking Order Models Under Different Institutional Environments
Abstract
In this paper, we examine the differences in information asymmetry and financing patterns and a generalized version of the trade-off theory across countries with different institutional environments. We find that firms in Civil law countries have higher information asymmetry, rely more on internally generated funds, and use more short-term debt to finance their financing deficit, relative to those in Common law countries. In both Civil law and Common law countries, factors suggested by the trade-off theory explain the financing deficit coefficient in the generalized version of the trade-off model. Overall, the generalized version of the trade-off theory provides a better explanation for the changes in capital structure relative to the pecking order theory, even in countries with higher information asymmetry.
Publication
SSRN Electronic Journal
Date
2009/05/14
Citation Key
farhatTestingTradeOffPecking2009
Accessed
12/17/19, 7:24 PM
Language
en
Library Catalog
Extra
2 citations (Crossref) [2023-10-31]
Citation Key Alias: lens.org/056-876-056-037-469
Citation
Farhat, J. B., Cotei, C., & Abugri, B. A. (2009). Testing Trade-Off and Pecking Order Models Under Different Institutional Environments. SSRN Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1404596
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