Virtues, vices, and situations: What warrants the ascription of character traits

In recent years, situationism in psychology has caught the attention of philosophers. Some have defended it. Some have argued against it. The situationist has challenged the traditional view shared by personality psychology and virtue ethics that people differ in terms of character or character traits and that we can explain and predict people's behavior by character traits people have. Previous responses to situationism try to show that experiments from social psychology do not undermine the traditional view. I agree and will further argue that the fact that experiments do not undermine the traditional view is not sufficient to warrant the attribution of character traits, and that some philosophical arguments are needed given that not enough empirical data that show a high degree of behavioral consistencies are available. I first offer an account of the ordinary attribution of character traits according to which having character traits is a matter of degree, and argue that the ordinary attribution account comes from the Aristotelian moral psychology and is consistent with a long-standing tradition, the trait paradigm, in personality psychology. Second, I argue that although situational factors play some role in explaining and predicting behavior, the attribution of character traits plays a primary and indispensable role. Third, I argue that ordinary attribution of character traits has important functions in our moral life, which cannot be fulfilled by the attribution of local traits suggested by the situationist. I also argue that the ethical management of situations recommended by the situationist can help in getting things right, but is not sufficient to be the adequate foundation for our normative discourse. © 2016 American Psychological Association.

2 citations (Crossref) [2023-10-31]